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CHAPTER 1: MANAGEMENT TECHNIQUES
3100 INTRODUCTION
There is direct relationship between the degree of safety achieved in a
NASA aerospace system and the management emphasis placed on the
safety of the system being designed, manufactured, tested, and operated.
This chapter of the safety manual describes the tasks that should be
accomplished and the working relationships that should be established to
formalize the system safety effort into a discipline, to the end that the
program manager will have maximum visibility into the risks he is
a s sum ing.
3101 PURPOSE AND SCOPE
This chapter provides functional safety managers with an outline of the
techniques that are useful in the planning, implementation, and admin-
istration of a system safety program. The management techniques de-
scribed are applicable to any size or type of NASA hardware develop-
ment program and throughout the entire system life cycle. These
methods should be implemented to the extent that the evolving
system safety effort fully supports the unique needs of the hardware
program. This Volume is intended to be evoluntionary in nature and
therefore subject to continuous upgrading and change as new methods
are developed and have been proven satisfactory for NASA application.
3102 RISK EVALUATION
i. The program manager of an aerospace system must assume certain
risks that are attendant to the design, manufacture, test, and opera-
tion of the hardware system to effectively accomplish the mission
for which the system was developed. The acceptance of these risks
should be based on thorough visibility as to the nature of hazards
and risks that are in existence and the options and alternatives to
the acceptance of the risks.
2. The decision on whether to assume a risk is clearly a program
management responsibility. This decision is no better than the
quality of the risk data that serves as a basis for the decision. Ac-
cordingly, the development of hazard and risk data should be as-
signed as a responsbility to professionals whose training and
orientation cause them to search out and find the hazards in the
system before these hazards manifest themselves in terms of
damaged or destroyed hardware.
3103 SYSTEM SAFETY PROGRAM ELEMENTS
1. Each functional system safety program has nine basic elements
which include:
a. Planning,
b. Organization,
c. Contracting,
I-I
d. Interface/Coordination,
e. Criteria,
f. Analysis,
g. Reporting,
h. Evaluation,
i. Data Retention.
. Each of the above elements and the related activities are described
in the ensuing paragraphs. All of these elements are oriented toward
an overall approach to risk evaluation by:
a. Identifying the hazards in the system.
b. Determining corrective actions that may be implementedtoeither
remove, or control, the hazard or to provide alternatives.
C. Recommending corrective action or alternatives to the appro-
priate management level for a decision to either resolve the
hazard or assume the risk.
d. Documenting those areas in which a decision has been made to
assume the risk, including the rationale for the risk assumption.
3.- The detail with which each of the nine safety program elements set
forth in subparagraph 1. is developed and implemented is dependent
upon the complexity and mission of the hardware system being de-
veloped.
3104 PLANNING
I. IORELIIVlINARY SAFETY TASKS
It is anticipated that, in most cases, formal planning of the safety
effort for support of the system feasibility studies would not be
initiated. There are, however, severaltypical safetytasks that should
be completed during these activities. These tasks then become the
foundation for the planning of system safety efforts during the system
definition, design, manufacture, test, and operation. These include:
a. A review of pertinent historical safety data from similar systems.
b. A continuing review of the gross hardware requirements and con-
cepts, to maintain an understanding of the evolving system.
c. A review of the proposed mission objectives.
d. Completion of the planning for follow-on safety activities.
e. The completion of preliminary hazard analyses to identify
potentially hazardous systems and to develop initial safety re-
quirements and criteria.
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fo Participation in trade studies with the result of the preliminary
hazard analyses identifying highly hazardous areas, with recom-
mendations as to the alternatives.
g. Identification of the requirement for special contractor safety
studies that may be required during system definition or design.
h. Estimation of gross resource requirements for the system safety
program during the complete system life cycle.
i. Preparation of an index document that identifies all pertinent
safety data developed during the life cycle of the system, such as
the results of analyses, the criteria and requirements imple-
mented, the results of special studies and the applicable his-
torical data. This index is updatedattheconclusion of each major
increment of the system development or as determined by pro-
gram milestone dates.
2. GOALS AND OBJECTIVES
a. Any planning exercise requires that certain basic decisions be
made. Safety goals and objectives should be established, and the
type of system safety input that is to be furnished to the overall
program should be determined prior to initiating the planning
effort. Goals should be measurable in every case and should
state what system safety would intend to accomplish as a result
of having performed the various safety tasks.
hi Once these safety goals and objectives have been established and
agreed upon by appropriate program management level, the
planner can begin to become familiar with both the evolving hard-
ware system and the environment within which the safety program
is to be conducted. Having equated the safety goals to the needs
of the system being developed, the planner considers all the
alternative methods and analyses that can be used to meet these
safety goals and objectives. The optimum methods are selected
from these alternatives and the planning is begun. It should be
noted that these goals must be structured such that safety tasks
can be selected that will accomplish the goals and when the tasks
have been completed the result of the effort will clearly demon-
strate that the goals have been met.
3. PLAN CONTENTS
The Safety Plan should include:
a. A description of the initial safety tasks initiated during the feasi-
bility studies, system definition, design, manufacture, test or
operation that are to be continued throughout the forseeable future
of the system life cycle.
be Additional tasks that are to be initiated during ensuing program
activities that evolve from the list of safety elements described
in paragraph 3103.
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c. The development of requirements for contractor safety effort.
d. An estimate of numbers and types of personnel required for the
safety effort.
e. A description of the methods that will be used to perform these
safety tasks, control the effort and accomplish the objectives.
f. Scheduling the safety effort including milestone identification,
program activities, phasing, and integration.
g. Identification of the safety output that will result from the effort,
the expected application of the output, with provisions for the
documentation of specific results of the safety effort.
A typical safety plan outline is shown as Figure i.
4. PLAN REVISIONS
a. It should be noted that if the planned safety program is to have
sufficient flexibility, the individual plan must be revised as re-
quired to satisfy the changing needs of the program, although the
plan should not be revised for the sake of change alone. Further,
it can readily be seen that a plan may vary in size from one page
in length to a detailedmulti-page document, depending on the size,
complexity and needs of the system.
b. The planning tends to be an iterative process in that the plan is
refined and expanded as milestones of the system development
are accomplished. Emphases are realigned, nonproductive tasks
are abandoned and new tasks developed as required to accomplish
the safety goals. Analysis methods are evaluated against pro-
gram needs and specific techniques are selected and implemented,
as required to provide a sufficient depth of safety/risk evaluation
visibility. ._
3105 ORGANIZATION _P
1. The organization of the functi}_nal system safety effort is developed
to accomplish the tasks set forth in the safety plan. Safety may be
part of the system engineering organization or part of a systems
effectiveness organization, collocated with the reliability, quality or
maintainability organizations. As a general rule, to maintain objec-
tivity and the check and balance system, it is preferable that system
safety not be part of the design engineering organization.
2. The major safety tasks to be accomplished are broken down into
subtasks and responsibilities assigned that will support accomplish-
ment of the safety goals. The ongoing activities, together with the
quantity and complexity of the safety tasks scheduled for completion,
dictate the size and technical depth of the safety organization. For
example, a safety organization may vary from only one man who
spends part of his time accomplishing the safety tasks to an organi-
zation of Z0 or more people supported by an extensive contracted
effort. Obviously good staffing practices should be followed, and the
greatest possible technical professionalism developed.
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CHECKLIST OF REQUIREMENTS FOR A SYSTEM SAFETY PLAN
1.0 PURPOSE AND SCOPE
2.0 APPLICABLE DOCUMENTS
(Reference only documents cited in the plan text)
3.0 SAFETY ORGANIZATION
3.1 Relationship to total organization
3.2 Organizational array
3.3 Responsibilities
3.4 Interfaces
4.0 SAFETY TASKS TO BE COMPLETED
4.1 Criteria development
4.2 Analyses
4.3 Design/program review participation
4.4 Contractor/subcontractor requirements
4.5 Reporting
4.6 Documentation
4.7 Planning
4.8 Evaluations
5.0 METHODS FOR ACCOMPLISHING SAFETY TASKS
5. i Criteria - development, documentation and monitoring
5.2 Analysis technique
5.3 Other program activities
6.0 SCHEDULE FOR TASK COMPLETION
(Keyed to major program milestones)
Figure1
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3106
o Irrespective of the relative size of the safety organization, it should
be placed in the reporting chain at a point which allows the risk
evaluation output resulting from the safety effort to flow directly to
the appropriate level of management in support of risk management
decisions.
CONTRACTING
1. TWO FORMS
Contracting of a system safety effort maytake one of two forms. The
effort may be contracted in a separate contract, such as a special
safety study during the early development, or may be part of the
total system procurement package. In either case, unless the re-
quirements being contracted are carefully prepared so that the con-
tractor clearly understands what he is expected to accomplish, the
contractor cannot provide the engineering and management services
being sought. The fundamental elements of the two forms of pro-
curement mentioned above are essentially the same and follow a
well-defined procurement system (see NASA Procurement Regula-
tion, Subpart 5Z - SAFETY).
2. THE REQUEST FOR PROPOSAL (KFP)
The RFP must state in clear, concise terms:
a. The scope of the effort.
b. The specific tasks the contractor is expected to perform.
c. The reporting requirements.
d. The program milestones that must be met.
e. That the contractor is expected to provide a system safety plan
as part of his bid package, which is in consonance with para-
graph 3104. This contractor plan should include a listing of the
system safety tasks he plans to complete and include a descrip-
tion of:
(I) The methods he plans to use in accomplishing these tasks.
(2) The output or product that will be produced by the safety
effort.
(3) The use that will be made of the safety output.
(4) The organization that will be developed to complete the task.
(5) The deliverables.
(6) The reporting of safety problems, activities, and accomplish-
ments.
(7) The sub-tier schedule of activities leading to task completion
in support of major program milestones.
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3. PROPOSAL EVALUATIONS FOR SOURCE SELECTION
The safety manager should participate in the proposal evaluation
activities and rate each proposal on the basis of the contractor's
demonstrated understanding of the RFP requirements reflected in
his plan as well as the cost history and the history of the contrac-
tor's past performance.
4. THE STATEMENT OF WORK
The evaluation of the proposal should also lead to the decision on the
suitability of the contractor's system safety plan for use as a seg-
ment of the overall statement of work. Normally a separate segment
of the statement of work covering the system safety requirements,
included in the contract schedule, is preferable to negotiation of the
contractor's safety plan since the contractor's plan is his blueprint
for meeting the requirements. This segment ofwork may be based on
the original RFP and the safety data submitted by the contractor as
part of his bid package.
3107 INTE R FACE/COORDINATION
i. GENERAL
The effectiveness of the functional system safety effort is determined
by the quality and quantity of the output and how that output is ap-
plied. The development of the output is dependent upon the interfaces
established, the currentness and quality of the data safety personnel
have to work with, and the technical competence within the safety
organization.
2. INTERFACE ESTABLISHMENT
Working interfaces should be established at the earliest possible
time in the system development and should be postured on the basis
that system safety has a valuable service to provide the other organi-
zations in the program. As each interface is established, the safety
manager should strive to reach an understanding with his counter-
parts as to:
a. The type of data that is to be produced by each organization.
b. The amount of this data that will be needed by safety personnel
and a schedule for its availability.
c. The use safety personnel will make of this data.
d. The output of the safety effort including the format and availability
schedule.
e. The safety data or effort that may be required by the interfacing
organizations.
Typical interfaces and data flows are pictured in Figure 2, which
shows the safety activity set apart on the left in order to better
describe the data exchange.
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3. THE SAFETY-ENGINEERING INTERFACE
The interface with engineering is especially important. This working
relationship should be developed during the early part of the system
development and continued throughout the life cycle to the conclusion
of the program. System safety personnel work closely with engineer-
ing personnel in developing safety criteria, and, based on the safety
analysis, recommend methods of reducing risks, coordinate on the
design of safety devices and recommend hardware changes to remove
or control hazards. Safety personnel provide close support and
assistance to the engineering staff during design and program re-
views, and, as the result of having performed a thorough technical
safety effort, should be able to make a significant contribution dur-
ing these reviews in terms of visibility into the risk assumption
status.
4. THE SAFETY-R & QA INTERFACE
a. The system safety-reliability and quality interface is of particular
interest because the two areas can provide effective support to
each other when properly conducted. Much of the data developed
by the reliability program finds use bythe functional safety effort
in the preparation of the Safety Analyses, and there are com-
mon interests between the two programs indesign review, failure
reporting and human error areas. It is therefore important that
the two areas coordinate closely with one another in program
planning and execution to ensure that each provides appropriate
support to the other and that duplication is eliminated.
b. The safety effort should provide the quality assurance organiza-
tion with inspection requirements for safety items and informa-
tion on safety critical characteristics. A rapid flow communica-
tion channel should be established and maintained to assure that
the safety staff receives quick notification of safety discrepan-
cies, parts failures and assembly errors.
5. THE SAFETY-CONFIGURATION MANAGEMENT INTERFACE
The safety-configuration management interface should be estab-
lished as soon as the design of the system is sufficiently well de-
fined to be controlled by a configuration management activity. Safety
personnel should review all changes for their potential impact on the
safety of the system. Safety changes especially should be reviewed
to determine that they do improve the safety and reduce the risk suf-
ficiently to merit implementing the change, The safety organization
also should participate in all proposal and committing change board
activities when safety changes are being exercised.
6. THE SAFETY-MANUFACTURING INTERFACE
a. The system safety-industrial safety working relationship is
established in the manufacturing, test and operations areas. The
system safety-manufacturing relationship can best be charac-
terized as advisory in nature, depending largely on the relative
effectiveness of the industrial safety program.
i-9
b.
C.
The system safety organization should review the manufacturing
planning of critical activities to assure that a fabrication or as-
sembly process does not exist that can result in residual damage
being incorporated into the system as part of the manufacturing
process.
Major reliance is also placed on the quality control activities
during the manufacture of the system, Requirements for special
inspection of safety critical items and activities should be in-
cluded on the proper drawings. These safety items are then
inspected by the quality people as part of their regular inspection
and buy-off activities with failure and rejection reports providing
a rich source of useful safety data.
7. THE SAFETY-SYSTEMS TEST INTERFACE
ao The system safety staff works closely with the test organization.
Test procedures are reviewed to assure that hazardous tests are
identified as such and that the procedures, prepared to operate
the system under test, contain shutdown and backout capability
as well as cautions and warning notes.
b. Test systems are analyzed to assure that hazards have been fully
considered and that the risks are minimized wherever possible,
Safety representatives should occasionally witness the accom-
plishment of hazardous testing to measure the validity of the
safety input to the test procedures and to gain a better under-
standing of the test activities.
8. THE SAFETY-OPERATIONS INTERFACE
a. The safety activities completed during operation of the system
include staff support during system final assembly, checkout and
validation, maintenance and operation. Hazardous tasks per-
formed as part of the checkout and launch are identified as such,
and the supporting contingency planning is reviewed thoroughly
to assure that exposure is minimized and recovery is well
organized and planned.
Do Ope rating
shutdown
cluded.
procedures
provisions,
are reviewed to assure that backout or
warning and caution notes have been in-
Ca Special attention is devoted to system interfaces since hazards
recognize neither contract nor mechanical boundaries. The safety
staff can make a major contribution to the system integration ac-
tivities as a result of having completed the normal safety tasks.
d. The participation of safety personnel in system operations should
be on an active basis, to measure the validity of the safety input
to the operations procedures and to become more familiar with
the operational program.
1 -I0
9. SYSTEM SAFETY-PROGRAM MANAGEMENT INTERFACE
at The effectiveness of the system safety effort is measured in terms
of the safety impact on the system from the standpoint of reduced
risks. One of the principal avenues available to exert this in-
fluence on the system is through the program manager's deci-
sions. Accordingly, the safety manager must establish an effec-
tive interface with the program manager so that the program
manager will understand what kind of an output can be expected
from the system safety effort, when this output will be received,
and how it will be useful to him. Next, safety personnel must
mount a competent effort to produce a technically accurate output
which is acceptable to both engineering and the program manager
from a technical standpoint.
bl The provision of this safety output, in the main, should be sched-
uled to the major program decision points such as the Prelimi-
nary Design Review (PDR), First Article ConfigurationInspection
(FACI), Design Certification Review (DCR), Flight Readiness
Review (FRR) and any other special reviews. The safety output
should be expressed as a total risk profile with sufficient sup-
porting data to enable the program manager to decide whether to:
(I) Assume the risks;
(2) Change the hardware to reduce the risks; or
(3) Revise the mission to reduce the exposure of the hardware
and thereby reduce the risks, or by imposing constraints at
control exposure to high risks.
El The safety manager should evaluate the output produced by the
effort performed in the name of safety on a continuing basis to
assure that it is useful, and that it is being used. This provides
a valuable control function to delete nonessential tasks from the
on-going safety activities.
3108
I0. OTHER INTERFACES
Where more than one field installation is involved in conducting the
system development and operation, it is vital that interinstallation
safety coordination meetings be held on a regularly scheduled basis
and that communication channels be opened and encouraged for the
expedited flow of safety data. This same type of safety data exchange
system should be used in the case where more than one prime con-
tractor is used by an individual field installation.
C RITE RIA
1. GENERAL
The second method by which the system may be influenced in addi-
tion to "through the decision process" (see paragraph 3107-9) is by
means of the criteria and requirements specified for the design,
development and operation of the system. Accordingly, special at-
tention should be devoted to the system criteria development process.
I-II
Z. DEVELOPMENT
Criteria are originated from the results of the safety analyses and
from the experience gained from other programs using similar sys-
tems. The process is described in Figure 3 and is repetitive in
nature to the extent that the criteria are evolved, imposed, and then
evaluated for effectiveness on an iterative basis. Any requirement
for which several waiver requests are received should be evaluated
to determine the practicality of relaxing the requirement. Otherwise,
waivers should be granted on a one-time-only basis. When a waiver
is granted, the information should be documented as a matter of
permanent record, with the reason or the justification for granting
the deviation also recorded. It cannot be emphasized too strongly
that each waiver may constitute an increase in the risk being as-
sumed and each deviation must be evaluated on its own merits. In
any case, waivers should be kept to a minimum.
3. DOCUMENTATION
All safety criteria and safety-related criteria should be recorded in
one document which is maintained on an up-to-date basis to show
how the requirements were developed and their current state of im-
plementation. Also, the waiver system should be maintained on a
very formal basis with each waiver an& the circumstances of its
issuance fully documented.
3109 ANALYSIS
I. System safety analyses are performed for the purpose of identifying
hazards and establishing risk levels. Further examination will re-
veal that in support of this concept, the analyses perform five basic
functions :
a. Provide the foundation for the development of safety criteria and
requirements.
b. Determine both whether and how the safety criteria and require-
ments provided to engineering have been included in the design.
c. Determine whether the safety criteria and requirements created
for that design have provided adequate safety for the system.
d. Provide part of the means for meeting pre-established safety
goals.
e. Provide a means of demonstrating that safety goals have been met.
Z. A very strong case can be made for the performance of safety analy-
ses on any system, and all too often the decision on undertaking the
effort is resolved down to a matter of economics. It is always neces-
sary to be prudent in the allocation of resources for any effort. From
the standpoint of safety analyses, economy should be based on the
selection of the appropriate analysis techniques to be used, based on
the requirements of the system, and the need for risk visibility.
Economy should never be based on the performance of no safety
analyses since the absence of analyses results in very little visibility
for the program manager as to the actual risk assumption status.
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3110 REPORTING
I. DEFINITION OF REQUIREMENTS
The requirements for reporting of progress, hazards and activities
should be defined in the various safety plans and/or contracts.
Z. GENERAL REPORTING
General reporting covers progress of the effort, milestones attained,
and significant accomplishments such as hazards identified and re-
solved. This type of reporting generally flows in consonance with
overall program reporting channels.
3. PROGRAM REVIEWS
Safety inputs to program reviews relative to the risks being assumed
and the status of hazard resolution are usually construed as a type of
reporting. This type of reporting is formalized around the individual
program review format.
4. SAFETY ANALYSES REPORT (SAR)
The SAR, or an input to the SAR, should be prepared in support of
each major engineering review and prior to beginning each mission.
The requirements for the SAR are contained in paragraph 1310, and
include such things as:
a. Risk levels, in terms of risks being assumed.
b. Rationale for the assumption of these risks and the alternative
considered.
c. Waivers to safety criteria that have been granted.
d. System safety activities that are behind schedule and have not
been completed.
These SAR's serve as a total record of the risks assumed in order
to complete each mission.
3111 EVALUATION
.
PURPOSE
The evaluation of a system safety program is performed in order to
determine that:
a. The safety management system is properly structured.
b. There is _ood access to both the system data and the proper
management reporting level.
c. The safety goals are being met and the planned tasks are being
accomplished and are on schedule.
d. There is an output resulting from the system safety effort.
e. Effective use is being made of safety output.
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2. METHOD
a. The evaluation of a safety program is begun by planning the re-
view. The system safety requirements that have been imposed on
the organization are determined and a copy of the organization's
safety plan is obtained. In general, the most satisfactory approach
is to measure the performance of the effort (what is being accom-
plished) against the approved plan (what was intended to be ac-
complished). Also an evaluation should be made as to whether the
plan itself is current and still responsive to program needs.
bl A checklist similar to the one shown in Figure 4 is a valuable
tool for recording the relative acceptability of the various parts
of the program. The numbers on the left of the checklist refer to
chapters in NHB 1700.1(VI). Special attention should be devoted
to areas of effort receiving inadequate attention or the accom-
plishment of nonproductive or redundant effort.
Ce The evaluation should include
manager to assess:
a discussion with the program
(i) The quality of the output from the safety effort that reaches
the program manager.
(2) Whether this output arrives in time to be useful to the program
manager.
(3) How the program manager uses this safety input.
(4) How the safety output can be improved and made more useful
to the program manager.
do Upon completion of planning, the organization that is to be reviewed
should be notified of the forthcoming evaluation and what is to be
covered in the assessment sufficiently well in advance so that
proper preparations and coordination can be completed. The
evaluation begins with an initial briefing to the appropriate man-
agement level that introduces the review team, covers the pur-
pose of the review, identifies what is to be evaluated and assures
a debriefing at the conclusion of the review.
ee The review is completed according to plan and the debriefing is
completed whenever possible with the same management people
as participated in the entrance briefing. The purpose of this de-
briefing is to come to an understanding of both the good things
that were found and the areas requiring increased emphasis or
improvement.
f. The report of the evaluation is coordinated with the reviewed
organization prior to publishing it, so that any discrepancies,
misunderstandings, or inaccurcies can be resolved.
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3. SCHEDULING
Reviews should be completed on a regularly scheduled basis, usually
once a year. More frequent evaluations should be scheduled only
when the review indicates a problem of major proportions that cannot
be resolved with less emphasis than the forcing function of a major
review.
3112 DATA RETENTION
I. As a result of having performed the safety activities described in
this volume, extensive system safety data will have been developed,
including :
a. Criteria and requirements.
b. Safety study reports.
c. Other reports, progress/activity.
d. Safety analysis reports.
e. Analyses.
f. Hazards reports.
g. Accident reports.
2. These items are valuable safety data that may have application to
other systems that are presently being developed, or will be devel-
oped in the future, and as such these data should be documented for
retention as they are prepared.
3. An up-to-date index of these data should be maintained for each
program that identifies this information by report number, title,
date of final issue, location, and a pertinent summary abstract so
that the data are readily available for use when needed,
1-17
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CHAPTER 2: TECHNICAL METHODS
INTRODUCTION
The formalization of the system safety activities in the hardware/
software development programs of NASA requires as a prerequisite
the selection of certain technical methods that are generally accepted
as the tools of that specific technology. It is recognized that only a cer-
tain amount of basic data evolves as a hardware system is developed.
These are the approved engineering drawings and specifications, together
with hardware test results, and it is from these basic data that all an-
cillary data are created. It therefore becomes a matter of major impor-
tance as to how these basic data are used and in what manner the data
are processed by the various supporting disciplines to accomplish their
respective missions. This chapter contains a brief description of those
methods that experience has proven to be most effective for use in
processing the basic engineering data and applicable ancillary data into
risk evaluation information.
PURPOSE AND SCOPE
I. This chapter describes in broad terms the technical system safety
methods that are available to a NASA program or system safety
manager for use in accomplishing a risk evaluation program. The
methods have been described in sufficient detail to provide under-
standing of the techniques and permit an evaluation of the analysis
results. This document does not provide detailed instructions on
these methods sufficient to permit the use of this Handbook alone to
perform these analyses. Hazard analysis reference publications and
training courses are set forth in Appendixes Band C, respectively.
The methods described herein are applicable to all NASA hardware
systems. The analysis methods may be expanded, reducedor altered
as required to suit the specific needs of any separate program, or
initiated during any time in the system development, thus assuring
maximum flexibility. Further, these methods are not restricted
exclusively to system safety and should be considered for appli-
cability to the industrial, public, and aviation safety activities.
. The reason for undertaking a program of safety analysis is to iden-
tify the hazards in a system. Once identified, these hazards are
evaluated, first in terms of the relative severity of the hazard,
which is the effect the hazardous event would have on the system
should the event occur and cause the system or an energy source to
go out of control. Secondly, the hazards are evaluated in terms of
the exposure of the total system or the time interval during which
the hazardous event can affect the system, considering also the
location of the hazard in the system. Thirdly, the hazard is evaluated
in terms of the likelihood that this event will occur, and, if deter-
mined quantitatively, may be expressed by means of probability
calculations.
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. The safety analyses are then reapplied to systematically search for
the alternatives to assuming excessively high risks during the testing
or operation of the system.
3202 HAZARD ANALYSES
lo The following analytical techniques are described in their logical
order of application during the system development life cycle, as
shown in Figure 5. The first method is the Preliminary Hazard
Analysis, which is used in the early phases of the development to
identify the energy sources being considered for use in the evolving
system, together with the methods selected for the control of these
energy sources.
Z, As the system becomes better defined and more detailed design data
evolve, the Fault Hazard Analysis can be undertaken. This analysis
addresses the system down to the piece-part level, if necessary, and
should include such items as mechanical linkages, wiring and ducting
which connect the critical system elements or components.
. The final analysis recommended for the more complex systems is
the Logic Diagram Analysis which is used to identify critical failure
paths. This analysis may be made quantitative using the Fault Tree
Technique should the program manager require this amount of
visibility.
1 Finally, manufacturing, test and operating procedures should be re-
viewed (Procedures Analysis) to assure that they are fully annotated
with cautions and warning notes and that their use does not initiate
any out-of- sequence events.
3203 PRELIMINARY HAZARD ANALYSIS
i . Usually the first analysis technique applied in a typical system
development program is a preliminary hazard analysis based on
descriptions of mission functions or events to be achieved. A pre-
liminary analysis is performed by applying data obtained on pre-
vious programs from systems analogous to those defined gener-
ically from the descriptions of subsystems considered for use in
accomplishing mission functions. The purpose of this analysis is
to identify safety critical areas and the hazards involved in the
mission(s) under consideration and provide management with risk
visibility during either feasibility studies or system definition activ-
ities. This preliminary analysis provides a comprehensive listing of
hazards commensurate with the generic system(s) defined. The com-
parative data utilized from analogous systems in previous programs
reflect the results of potential hazards identified from analyses and
experience with those hardware systems, with emphasis on all as-
pects of these systems and their usage.
Z. The preliminary hazards analysis should include:
a. A review of all pertinent safety data produced by other NASA
systems to take advantage of previous safety experience.
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b. A review of all pertinent data related to the evolving system as
a means of learning the system.
c. A listing of all energy sources such as:
(i) Electrical
(2) Mechanical
(3) Chemical
(4) Nuclear
d. Determining the design features or procedures that have been
developed to control the energy sources listed in subparagraph c.
e. Identifying energy sources for which inadequate controls have
been adopted, or high risk areas.
f. Identifying safety requirements and criteria incorporated or
needed to assure control of the energy sources and documenting
them for future program application.
g. Making recommendations to the program manager in cases where
inadequate controls exist.
h. Reiterating the process as frequently as required to support
major program changes.
i. The use of this information as applicable for an input into trade
studies and program reviews.
o In performing a preliminary hazard analysis, a chronological listing
of functions or events provides a basis for defining generic systems.
An example listing of mission functions or events with generic sys-
tems to perform those functions on an unmanned space vehicle is
presented in Figure 6.
. The next step in the preliminary hazard analysis is to determine the
hazards involved with each of the defined generic systems. The haz-
ard determination is based on data and experience from previous
programs. For brevity in this hazard analysis example, the listing
of hazards for only one of the mission functions is presented. Un-
desired events and their causes for the generic systems defined
from a launch-boost function are presented in Figure 7 together with
identified safety features and inadequate controls as a means of
determining areas needing further consideration.
3204 FAULT HAZARD ANALYSIS
, This analysis technique is the second in the series, with increased
complexity over the Preliminary Hazards Analysis. A more com-
pletely defined system and greater system knowledge are required
Z-4
UNMANNED MISSION FUNCTION LISTING EXAMPLE
MISSION EVENTS
LAUNCH- BOOST
FAIRING SEPARATION
ORBITAL INJECTION
SOLAR PANEL DEPLOYMENT
ATTITUDE POSITIONING
ORBIT CORRECTION
DATA ACQUISITION
MID- COURSE CORRECTION
STAR ACQUISITION
DATA ACQUISITION AND
T R ANS M ISS ION
GENERIC SYSTEMS
Guidance, Fuel, Engines, Destruct
Staging, Oxidizer, Flight Control,
Electrical, Telemetry
Separation, Electrical
Engine Shutdown, Payload Separation,
Electrical, Guidance
Squib, Unfolding, Electrical
Reaction Control, Electrical, Navi-
gation
Propulsion, Computer, Electrical,
Navigation
Antenna, Telemetry, Computer, Elec-
trical
Propulsion, C o m p u t e r, Navigation,
Electrical
Navigation, Reaction Control, Com-
puter, Electrical
Sensing, Data Storage, Telemetry,
Electrical
Figure 6
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for this analysis since the emphasis is oriented to the appropriate
system element level, rather than toward a systems approach. The
analysis provides greatly increased visibility from the standpoint of
primary and secondary failures, as well as sequential failures, and
may be performed either as an extension of the Failure Modes and
Effects Analysis (FMEA) or independently from the FMEA. In the
event that FMEA's have not been accomplished, a comparable set of
data must be developed by the safety analyst before the Fault Hazard
Analysis can be completed.
Z. The data required for this analysis include up-to-date:
a. Drawings, specifications and hardware (system) descriptions.
b. Mission time lines (projected).
c. Failure modes and effects analyses.
d. Historical data including test results.
. The Fault Hazard Analysis (FHA) is used to define the effects of
various subsystem component or piece-part failure modes, to evalu-
ate these effects on system equipment or personnel, and to determine
which subsystem effects should be further analyzed during subse-
quent safety analysis. The FHA considers all these system elements
in the subsystem and, therefore, all the interface effects resulting
from internal failures. Analyzing at the appropriate system ele-
ment level allows the identifiable hazards to be found, because, in
the FH_A, each hazardous event must terminate in a subsystem major
component.
. The format shown in Figure 8, which is an extension of the normal
FMEA, may be used in performing the Fault Hazard Analysis. The
following subparagraphs provide information ontheuseofthis format
by reference to column heading:
a. Component. Components are defined, at the discretion of the
analyst, by their physical or functional significance to the
subsystem or its design c o n c e p t, or in accordance with
NHB 5300.4(IA), Reliability Program Provisions for Space System
Contractors. The following guide for defining the major com-
ponents is included to facilitate understanding of the types of
natural separations to consider. Itis not intended to be exhaustive.
(i) Electronic Logic Circuits. Many components are made up from
a small number of basic circuit designs which perform an
identifiable purpose. These are used as building blocks for
larger circuits designed to perform the required logic func-
tions to the subsystem. To minimize the analysis required,
the basic circuits can be defined as major components, and
an analysis made of each logic function.
(z) Mechanical Devices. Mechanical devices can be either a single
part or an assembly of parts which perform one function. For
a Fault Hazard Analysis, a major mechanical component can
be defined as either of these. The use in the circuit will dictate
Z-7
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(3)
(4)
(5)
(6)
to what level of detail mechanical parts should be considered.
Single parts which might be considered major components are:
solid drive shafts, engine blocks, primary structure, etc. The
majority of mechanical devices will be assemblies of many
parts and it is more reasonable to treat the assemblies as
major components. For example: relays, pumps, motors,
mechanical safety devices, and other similar devices. This
permits the majority of vendor supplied mechanical de-
vices to be analyzed as major components, thus avoiding the
requirement for vendors to provide Fault Hazard Analyses of
their subsystems.
Electrical Systems. Major components can be basic compo-
nents of a circuit or combinations of components (such as
amplifiers, rectifiers, or regulators) used to perform one
single function. The level of analysis should be based on the
importance of the part as a functional element in the design.
Chemical Systems. In systems containing chemlcal compounds,
the chemicals should be considered as major components if
these compounds can cause failures of other components
through chemical reaction or release of chemical energy.
Examples of chemical components are: fuels, pressurants,
coolants, and preservatives.
Safety Devices. Safety devices should always be considered
major components since they are used primarily to protect
against undesired events.
Wiring. Interconnecting wiring of major components may be
considered a major component. Internal wiring can be con-
sidered as a part of a major component. Physical characteris-
tics of cables which circumvent failures between wires should
be stated in the cable analysis.
Do Component Failure Mode. Failures of major components consist-
ing of one part require a listing of the modes in which that part
may fail. Failures of major components consisting of more than
one part will require a failure mode and effects reliability analy-
sis to determine how the failure modes of each part will affect
the components' output. These effects will bethel allure modes of
the major component listed in the Fault Hazard Analysis. All fail-
ure modes of the component must be listed.
C° Component Failure Rate. The predicted reliability or the failure
rate computed from the best available data of primary failures
should be tabulated in this column for each major component in
each of its modes of failure. These data can be used in evaluating
probability of the fault event or in selecting which critical or
catastrophic events should be analyzed if the decision is made not
to analyze all events so classified. These data also serve as a
data bank for future reference when the need arises to analyze
other undesired events as a result of system changes.
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e.
System Operational Mode. Many major components are only
recurrently activated during the system's operational life. The
level of stress of these components will change from one system
mode to another. The effect of a failure in each mode can be dif-
ferent; for example, components supplied with power only during
a test can create a fault hazard only while a test is performed.
Failures existing in one mode of system operations can also
adversely affect the system when the mode is changed. Therefore,
each major component failure mode must be analyzed for possible
effects on all system operational modes.
Effect of Primary Component Failure on Subsystem. The effect of
the component's abnormal output on the operation is listed in this
column. The effect will be of the immediate functional output on
the most proximate downstream components. No secondary con-
siderations are necessary. A description of the functional effect
on normal subsystem operation will supply the required infor-
mation. Some failures can initiate a normal chain of events within
the subsystem. Those sequences that are inherent to the design
can also be reported as a primary effect. The description of the
subsystem effect should be identified by its particular oriented
function and also by form and magnitude of output energy. This
information is necessary when using the completed Fault Hazard
Analysis for construction of the Logic Diagram Analysis. Once
an undesired event has been defined, all primary failure modes
can be found by scanning this column.
f. Factors That May Cause Secondary Component Failure
(i)Any major component operating in a system is subject to out-
of-tolerance or abnormal inputs. There may be no source of
such conditions within the subsystem under analysis, but once
integrated into a system, abnormalities can arise. To insure
detection of the hazardous secondary conditions which can
cause equipment failure, the limits beyond which failure oc-
curs will be listed. This information is very significant, be-
cause a failure causing an out-of-tolerance condition can
affect many critical system functions simultaneously and may
degrade the system's safety.
(Z) The following information, where applicable, should be included
in this column:
(a) Effect of power reversals.
(b) Effect of high and low power.
(c) Temperature and moisture limits.
(d) Shock limits.
(e) Vibration limits.
(f) RFI limits.
Z-lO
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(g) Electromagnetic limits.
(h) Transient effects.
(i) Chemical effects (including corrosion).
(j) Any other source of energy which, if supplied in sufficient
quantity, will cause the primary failure rate to increase.
Upstream Components or Inputs that May Cause Sequential
Failures. The analysis cannot be continued unless it is known how
the out-of- sequence event could occur due to the power functioning
of the component. It was shown above that a fault effect on a sub-
system may be caused by a primary or secondary failure on a
component. This column shows how the fault effect on the sub-
system may be caused by the component as the result of having
improper input signals applied. This is termed a "sequential
failure" and describes the specific subsystem oriented functions
and their energy level required to cause the out-of-sequence
failure mode. Improper outputs of the most proximate upstream
components should be listed.
Further Analysis Required. Having completed the analyses nec-
essary to fill out the preceding columns, the analyst is prepared
to make recommendations on the necessity for additional analyses
or corrective action. The basis for these recommendations is the
result of reviewing the data developed against the risk factors of
severity, exposure and probability of occurrence as cited pre-
viously, and a yes or no decision is reached which is entered in
Column h with appropriate remarks added to Column i.
Remarks
(1) This column is used to include additional information needed
to clarify or verify information in the other columns, or to
provide a permanent note of recommended future action. A few
examples of usage are given below:
{a) Describe the number and type of monitors on this major
component failure mode, if known.
(b) Show the recommendations for further system analysis or
corrective action as a permanent note.
(c) Explanation of a major component definition in doubtful
cases.
(d) A coding to show data source and validity of the primary
failure rates.
(e) A discussion of sequential failure events is entered in
Column g.
(f) When applicable, a statement that the major component is
an interface component and requires an input from another
subsystem or can provide the abnormal output in Column e.
Z-ll
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(2) When the decision is made not to proceed into the logic dia-
gram analysis, the product of the Fault Hazard Analysis--
which is included in Columns g and h of the tabulation -- may
be used as follows:
(a) To provide visibility as to the relative safety at the sub-
system level.
(b) To establish the need for additional design requirements,
safety devices, control procedures or mission constraints
(red line values).
(c) As background safety data for support of design reviews to
assure that safety requirements have been met.
(d) As the basis for safety support of trade-off studies.
LOGIC DIAGRAM ANALYSIS
I. GENERAL
The logic diagram analysis technique is the finalprogressive step in
the series of safety analyses. The effort can be undertaken in incre-
ments as the major subsystem configurations are defined; however,
the complete system configuration must be established before the
total analysis can be accomplished. The analysis is flexible and pro-
vides maximum visibility for the total system viewpoint by clearly
showing the critical fault paths that exist in the system, which are not
revealed by the previously described analytical techniques.
2. METHOD
A logic diagram is a graphic representation of the various parallel
and series combinations of subsystem failures which can result in
a predetermined system failure. The accomplishment of a Logic
Diagram Analysis is undertaken in the following series of steps:
a. Definition of the Undesired Event. Every system developed has
one or more events which that system cannot tolerate, such as
a catastrophic loss of a system, loss of a crew, or loss of a
mission. It follows then that these are the events which must be
prevented from occurring; and, in turn, prevention of these events
becomes the objective of the logic diagram analysis. The initial
step in the performance of a logic diagram analysis is the defi-
nition of the event which must be kept from happening. While the
definition of these undesired events may originate from within
the functional safety organization, senior management concurrence
should be obtained as a prerequisite to begin the analysis.
b. Obtain Data That Describes the System and Its Planned Use:
(i) Update the data obtained for the Fault Hazard Analysis to the
current baseline.
(2) Develop cognizance of all significant changes to the system
baseline.
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c. Develop the Logic Diagram. Once the predetermined event has
been established as described in subparagraph a above, deter-
mine the necessary parallel and series events which will cause
the end event to occur. This process is continued through the sub-
system level to the appropriate component or piece-part level.
In cases of safety critical components, as defined in the Fault
Hazard Analysis, the process is always continued to the piece-
part level. These series and parallel events are connected by
use of the following graphic symbols:
(1) Events. The various kinds of events used in a logic diagram
are represented by the following symbols:
(a) The RECTANGLE identifies
an event that results from a
combination of fault events.
(b) The CIRCLE identifies a ba-
sic failure of a component.
(c) The HOUSE indicates an event
which is normal for the sys-
tem.
Output
F
Output
Output
(d) The DIAMOND identifies a
failure which has not been
fully developed due to lack of
information or significance.
(g) Logic Operators. The logic op-
erators required to develop the
logic diagram are defined and
symbolized as follows:
(a) The ANDGATEdescribes the
logical operation which re-
quires the coexistence of all
inputs to cause the output.
0 utput
Output
m !
Inputs
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(b) The PRIORITY AND GATE
performs the same function
as the AND GATE except that
the inputs must occur in the
sequence stipulated.
Output
_DPrtortty
escription)
[ !
Inputs
(c) The CONSTANT REPAIR
performs the same function
as the AND GATE except that
the repair time of the output
event is not dependent on the
repair times of the inputs. ! !
Inputs
Repair JTimes
(d) The OR GATE describes the
logical operation whereby the
output is caused by the oc-
currence of any oftheinputs.
(e) The EXCLUSIVE OR GATE
performs the same function
as the OR GATE except that
specified inputs cannot co-
exist.
Output
Inputs
Output
2><
Inputs
Restrtctton_
(f) The CONSTANT REPAIR OR
GATE performs the same
function as the OR GATE ex-
cept that the repair time of
the output event is not de-
pendent on the repair times
of the input.
Output
Inputs
Repair ]Times
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(g) The INHIBIT GATE describes
a situation in which a certain
condition of the system must
exist before one failure pro-
duces another. The inhibit
condition may be either nor-
mal to the system or be the
result of equipment failures.
Output
Q)-(7' ')RandomCondition
Input
Output
_ Functional ]
Condition J
Input
(h) The MATRIX GATE is used
to describe a situation in
which an output event is pro-
duced for certain combina-
tions of events at the inputs.
A matrix showing the event
combinations that produce the
output event will accompany
each usage of this symbol.
Output
I
Input
(3) Special Symbols. Special sym-
bols are used in order to sim-
plify the graphic representa-
tion of fault tree construction.
These special symbols are shown
below:
(a) The TRANSFER symbol is
used to show continuity be-
tween two parts of the tree.
A line into the side of the
triangle transfers everything
below to another area identi-
fied by the triangle with a
line drawn from the apex.
5
Output
I
I I
!
!
Input
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(b)An ELLIPSE with a line ex-
tending out along the major
axis is used when a compo-
nent appears several times
at the same place (e.g., at
i0 stage counter). Only one
of the inputs is drawn and the
ellipse is drawn to encompass
the output. This indicates
that the failure rate of that
event is to be multiplied by
the given factor for an OR
GATE or raised to a given
power for an AND GATE.
d. Critical Fault Path Identification
Output
!
Input
(i) A critical fault path is that chain of events which is the most
likely to result in a particular predetermined event or poten-
tial accident. There may be several chains of various degrees
of dominance. These chains and their associated degrees of
dominance are most clearly identified in the system safety
model (logic diagram). Critical fault path(s) and their relative
degree of dominance are determined either by event weighting
(inspection) or mathematical solution of the model.
(Z) Since the most critical fault path is the most likely avenue
along which predetermined event(s) can occur, the most effec-
tive approach is to concentrate the initial corrective action in
this area. It may be necessary to consider other paths within
the model, in a descending order of dominance, in order to
achieve an acceptable level of risk for the occurrence of a
particular predetermined event or potential accident.
(3)The steps required to provide effective use of the identification
of critical fault paths are as follows:
(a) Assure that the system safety model for a given predeter-
mined event or potential accident has been developedto the
extent necessary to identify critical fault paths. As a mini-
mum the logic diagram development must encompass all
these safety features and devices which have been designed
into the system which may be extracted from the previous
analyses. This assures that adequate consideration has
been given to those areas of the system which contain the
greatest risk. Safety features and devices are normally
placed where there exists the greatest riskofan undesired
event occurring.
(b) By logical inspection or mathematical process, determine
the degree of dominance for those critical fault paths of the
model which contribute the most to the risk. Logical in-
spection is the logical thought process of a trained and
experienced analyst being applied through examination of
the model. This process, associated with whatever mental
weighting factors he may consider during the examination
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to determine which events "look to be" more probable than
others, would lead to the resulting statement by the ana-
lyst: "these events (identified) and critical fault path(s)
look to be the most probable." The term "mathematical
process" can be a solution of the model by any of several
methods. Since the purpose of the quantitative evaluation of
a diagram is to evaluate the critical fault paths and estab-
lish their relative significance, the diagram is usually sim-
plified by inspection to minimize the logic diagram struc-
ture to be evaluated. This inspection results in elimination
of those events and branches which are obviously insig-
nificant compared to others which are inputs to the same
gate.
(c) Evaluate the dominant critical fault paths by accomplishing
the following steps:
(i) Establish a predetermined limit within which the initial
path selection is bounded. This involves the identifi-
cation of those paths which are computed to be above
any established limit for the system. If the paths are
near or below the limit, then they are selected by pick-
ing those which are within an "order of magnitude" or
so of the limit, or are of the same type.
(ii) The initial selection must be divided into groups for
which a set of predeterminedlimits has been established
for each grouping. The grouping of paths is accom-
plished by selecting those within an order of magnitude
of each other or those which have an apparent com-
monality within the system.
(iii)
(iv)
(v)
Determine whether a common point of departure exists
among the paths of each group. This evaluation involves
determining whether there are common faults among
the paths. Recommended changes to the system at these
common points provide the most effective way to elimi-
nate critical fault paths, or at least reduce them to
an acceptable level of risk.
Convert the logic diagram dominant critical fault paths
by grouping events at logical summary points. Conver-
sion of the logic diagram critical fault paths involves
making a listing of those events which when "ored"
result in an interim event. The method is to convert
each path to a simplified alternating "and", "or", "and",
"or", etc., relationship.
Simplify the logic diagram of the dominant critical fault
path by logically re-diagramming.
(vi) Determine those events for which a design change or the
development of a procedure will best and most cost-
effectively reduce the probability of occurrence of an
undesired event to an acceptable level of risk.
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(vii)
(viii)
(ix)
System safety trade-off studies may be made by insert-
ing alternative solutions as derived by subparagraphs (i)
through (vi) and repeating the process until an accept-
able level of risk is obtained. This step involves working
with designers and selecting several alternative system
changes to reduce the probability of occurrence of each
path. For each alternative to be evaluated the logic
diagram is changed to reflect the change and the dia-
gram is re-computed to determine the change impact.
Care must be exercised to assure that other paths or
branches of the diagram which have the same event or
fault sequence are also changed to reflect the change
being evaluated.
Advise appropriate level of management of findings and
recommendations.
Diagnostic analyses also may be performed by the use
of this technique. The analyst sets the accident that ac-
tually happened as his undesired event and develops the
diagrams as described in subparagraphs a through c
above.
3206 PROCEDURES ANALYSIS
. GENERAL
The purpose of the procedures analysis is to identify and/or imple-
ment the safety requirements that should be met to assure safe test
or operation of the system. The data required for the performance of
these analyses include:
a. Drawings, specifications and hardware (system) descriptions.
b. Mission time lines or test requirements.
c. Results of all safety analyses previously performed.
d. Historical data from previously performed tests on similar
systems.
Z. THE SAFETY- PROCEDURES INTERFACE
The safety-procedures interface is established in three steps
follows :
as
So
Do
Working with the engineering organization, establish specific
safety requirements and insert them into the test or operations
requirements documentation.
Review the test or operations procedures when they have been
prepared to verify that the safety requirements included in the
test or operations requirements documentation have been included
in the procedures. Special attention should be devoted to backout
and shutdown capability and to assure the procedures include
end-to- end verification,
2-18
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.
Cl Monitor the actual test or operation to assure the adequacy of
the safety impact to the procedures and to assure that the re-
quirements are followed.
Test procedures include developmental, qualification, acceptance and
system validation. Operating procedure includes handling, storage,
transportation, maintenance, operation and emergency.
METHOD
a, This analysis technique involves the review of all operating pro-
cedures associated with the program. Emphasis is placed on the
completeness of the procedures, including all cautions to be exer-
cised regarding inadvertant out-of-sequence operations, and the
inclusion in the procedures of adequate recycle and backout in-
structions to counter potential emergency situations. Documenta-
tion of identified hazards involved with operational and remedial
procedures will provide management visibility of the risks in-
volved and corrective action needed for avoiding or reducing the
hazards.
b. Analyses consisting of reviews of prepared procedures for the
following nonoperational activities in a system development pro-
gram should include:
(1) Manufacturing
(Z) Personnel Skill Certification
(3) Test
(4) Transportation
(5) Storage
(6) Pre-Operation Checkout
(7) Maintenance
C. Figures 9 and 10
examples that may
cedures analyses.
are typical checklists that contain hazard
benefit the safety analyst in performing pro-
QUIRE MENTS VERIFICATION
The product of the analytical safety effort consists of safety visi-
bility used in support of risk managenent decisions and safety re-
quirements used to influence design or procedures that test or oper-
ate the system. It is necessary not only to establish the initial safety
requirements and criteria, but to evaluate these requirements and
criteria on an iterative basis to assure they accomplish the intent
for which they were originated. Moreover, new requirements may be
developed or existing requirements changed in order to maintain the
established safety level of the system.
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Original safety requirements and criteria stem from data extracted
from experience gained on similar systems, standard system safety
technology and the preliminary hazards analysis. More detailed
safety analysis such as the fault hazard analysis and the logic dia-
gram analysis will yield requirements that are unique to the evolving
system.
Concurrently with the performance of these analyses, the original
safety criteria should be assessed to verify that these requirements
correctly continue to influence the design as it evolves. It is essen-
tial, as these safety requirements are developed or refined, that they
be documented and that this documentation be maintained on an up-
to-date basis for design use.
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APPENDIX A: INSTALLATION SUPPLEMENTAL INSTRUCTIONS
AND REQUIREMENTS
,
Z,
,
.
In order that all regulations concerning various aspects of the NASA
Safety Program (i.e., agency and installation) are maintained in one pub-
lication, the volumes of the NASA Safety Manual have been designed so
that installation supplements will be issued and filed with the basic regu-
lations.
Installations will issue, as Supplements to each volume, their implement-
ing instructions in a format similar to that indicated in Exhibit A of this
Appendix. The installation Supplements will be issued as page inserts to
those paragraphs needing implementation and will be filed as near to the
implemented paragraph as possible. The implementing instructions will be
printed on color paper stock.
The Cover Sheet for each Supplement will be in a format similar to that
indicated in Exhibit B and will contain the following information:
a. A list of the basic paragraphs being implemented.
b. A synopsis, if helpful, of the new implementing instructions.
C. A statement that basic paragraphs should be annotated "See
Sup. ."
In the sample formats in Exhibits A and B, the abbreviation "NHQ" desig-
nates "NASA Headquarters." Field installations should use individual
designations (e.g., "IvISC" for Manned Spacecraft Center, "FRC"for Flight
Research Center). Headquarters Supplements will be printed on green
paper.
5. In no case will this volume be reproduced or reprinted in any manner.
a-1

NHQ Sup. i.
Effective Date :
NASA HEADQUARTERS SUPPLEMENT 1
to
NASA Safety Manual
(NHB 1700.I(V3))
I. NHQ 330Z-Za(g)(c)(i)
(Include installation supplemental procedures only)
NHQ Sup. I. (Page Number)
EXHIBIT A--SUPPLEMENT
NHQ SUPPLEMENT I
to
NASA Safety Manual
(NHB 1700.i (V3)
Issue Date:
This Supplement contains NASA Headquarters (NHQ)
implementation of basic paragraphs 1302, 3401 and
3504. These paragraphs should be annotated "See NHQ
Sup. i."
NHQ 303Z Requires processing of NHQ. Form 00
through Code BN.
FILING INSTRUC TIONS
i. (Include appropriate instructions for filing.)
EXHIBIT B--COVER SHEET
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APPENDIX B: SYSTEM SAFETY REFERENCES
SAFETY PROGRAM
DIRECTIVE NO. 1
NASA TM-X 53282
NASA TM-X 53612
NASA TM-X 53305
NASA TM-X 53664
NASA TM-X 53563
NASA TM-X 53388
NHB 5300.4(1A)
SP 6506
AFSC DH I- 1
AFSC DH l- 6
AFSCM 127-I
AMCP 385-Z3
MIL-S TD 882
NASA
SYSTEM SAFETY REQUIREMENTS FOR MANNED
SPACE FLIGHT, OMSF, WASHINGTON, D.C.
LAUNCH VEHICLE SAFETY ENGINEERING FOR
STANDARD PAYLOAD MODULE, OCTOBER g0, 1965,
MSFC
THE SYSTEMS SAFETY PROGRAM FOR
SPACE LAUNCH VEHICLE GENERAL
MENTS, MAY Z3, 1967, MSFC
A TOTAL
REQUIRE-
STANDARD PAYLOAD MODULE SYSTEM ANALYSIS
PROCEDURES FOR SYSTEM DEFINITION, JULY 26,
1965, MSFC
SYSTEMS SAFETY CRITERIA FOR USE IN PREPA-
RATION OR REVIEW OF PROCEDURES, OCTO-
BER 17, 1967, MSFC
SYSTEM SAFETY HANDBOOK, JANUARY 6, 1967,
MSFC
SATURN V SYSTEM SAFETY PROGRAM ADEQUACY
EVALUATION, FEBRUARY 1, 1966, MSFC
RELIABILITY PROGRAM PROVISIONS FOR SPACE
SYSTEM CONTRACTORS, R&QA, CODE KR, WASH-
INGTON, D.C.
AN INTRODUCTION TO THE ASSURANCE OF HUMAN
PERFORMANCE IN SPACE SYSTEMS, R&QA, CODE
KR, WASHINGTON, D.C.
DOD
DESIGN HANDBOOK
DESIGN HANDBOOK, "SYSTEM SAFETY" (Also ref-
erence listed herein.)
SYSTEM SAFETY MANAGEMENT
MANAGEMENT SYSTEM SAFETY
SYSTEM SAFETY PROGRAM FOR SYSTEMS, AND
ASSOCIATED SUBSYSTEMS AND EQUIPMENT: Gen-
eral Requirements for
b-1
AFETRM IZT-I
AFSCM IZT-I
SAMSOM 127- 1
EXHIBIT 68-8
SAMSO
RANGE SAFETY MANUAL (VOLUME I)
SAFETY, SYSTEM SAFETY MANAGEMENT, AIR
FORCE SYSTEMS COMMAND
SAFETY, PLANS, PROGRAMS AND PROCEDURES
(Volume IV),SYSTEM SAFETY ENGINEERING, SPACE
AND SYSTEMS ORGANIZATION MANUAL, USAF
WEAPONS SYSTEMS SAFETY ANALYSIS REQUIRE-
MENTS, SAMSO-AFSC, LOS ANGELES, CALIFORNIA,
NOVEMBER 1968
SYSTEM SAFETY ENGINEERING, HAZARD ANALYSIS
REQUIREMENTS, SAFETY OFFICE (SMW) SAMSO-
AFSC, LOS ANGELES, CALIFORNIA, JULY 1968
(MAJOR P. J. STACK)
D2-I17018-I
DZ-84303-I
D2-11906Z-I
CONTRACTOR
APOLLO LOGIC DIAGRAM ANALYSIS GUIDELINF__,
THE BOEING COMPANY, SEATTLE, JUNE 1968
SYSTEMS SAFETY ENGINEERING ANALYSES TECH-
NIQUF___S, THE BOEING COMPANY, SEATTLE, FEB-
RUARY 1963
SYSTEM SAFETY ENGINEERING
BOOK, THE BOEING COMPANY,
FLORIDA, JUNE 1969
ANALYSIS HAND-
COCOA BEACH,
b-g
APPENDIX C: TRAINING COURSES
COURSE NO.
104
ASM 576
ASM 577
ASM 578
ASM 579
TITLE
System Safety
System Safety Analysis
Fundamentals of
System Safety
Aeronautical Systems
Safety
Missile and Space
Vehicle Systems Safety
System Safety
Technology
Advanced Safety
Program Management
SCHOOL
George Washington Univ.
Washington, D.C.
University of Washington
Seattle, Washington
University
California,
University
California,
University
California,
Uni ve r sity
California,
University
California,
of Southern
Los Angeles
of Southern
Los Angeles
of Southern
Los Angeles
of Southern
Los Angeles
of Southern
Los Angeles
DURATION
2 weeks
2 weeks
3 weeks
3 weeks
3 weeks
3 weeks
3 weeks
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